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PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS:
WHO WILL GET THE WATER?
NEW MEXICO V. AAMODT

New Mexico v. Aamodt:

Pueblo water rights are not subject to New Mexico law of prior
appropriation; these rights may be reserved rights. Whatever their
nature, they are prior to all those non-Indian rights recognized pursuant to the 1924 and 1933 Pueblo Lands Acts. The court's suggestion that the Pueblos may have reserved rights may become the
formulation of a new test for the existence of a reserved right.
FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1966 New Mexico instituted a suit pursuant to its water adjudication statutes1 to determine the water rights to the NambePojoaque River System. The San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, and
Tesuque Pueblos, the United States, and approximately 1,000 others
were named defendants in the suit. The United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico entered an interlocutory order that
the pueblos' water rights were controlled by New Mexico's law of
prior appropriation. 2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the United
States and the pueblos appealed this order to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.' On appeal, the basic issue before
the court was "whether water uses by Pueblo Indians in New Mexico
are controlled by state water law based on the doctrine of prior
appropriation." 4 The court held that the pueblo water rights are not
subject to state law and then, after classifying the possible nonIndian claimants into three groups, attempted to give the lower federal court some tentative guidance concerning the priority of issues
among these groups and the pueblos.'
In arriving at its holding, the court suggested that the pueblo water
1. N.M. STAT. ANN. § §75-4-1 to 75-4-11 (Repl. 1968).
2. In addition, responding both to the determination of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs that private attorneys be retained for the Pueblos and the complaint in intervention
filed on behalf of the Pueblos by these private attorneys, the district court ordered pursuant
to its own motion that the Pueblos could not be represented by private attorneys and struck
the tendered complaint in intervention; the appeal of this order by the Pueblos and the
subsequent ruling by the Tenth Circuit is not discussed in this note.
3. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. deniedsub nom. New
Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
4. Id. at 1104.
5. Id. at 1112-13.
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Tights may be reserved rights;6 however, the opinion also stated that
the "decisions recognizing reserved water rights on reservations
created by the United States are not technically applicable" 7 since,
as between the United States and the pueblos, "[t] he United States
had nothing to reserve." In the face of this statement, the court
went on to rule that any reserved rights the publos may have had
were not lost as a result of the creation of the Pueblo Lands Acts of
1924 and 1933 and that the pueblo water rights (whatever their
nature) are prior to all those non-Indian rights recognized pursuant
to the 1924 and 1933 Acts. 9
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Barrett concluded that the pueblo
water rights are reserved rights. 1 However, Barrett further concluded that by accepting additional appropriations of public funds,
the pueblos had subjected those reserved rights in use or which had
been in use for irrigation purposes as of May 31, 1933 to New
Mexico law.1 1 Consequently, Barrett maintained that these rights are
placed "on the same footing" as those of the non-Indians whose
rights were recognized pursuant to the 1924 and 1933 Acts.' 2 However, because of § 9 of the latter Act, Barrett recognized that the
pueblo rights are not subject to loss by nonuse or abandonment. 1 3
Barrett closed his dissent by deciding that those pueblo water uses
occurring after May 31, 1933 "enjoy the full benefit of the Winters
Doctrine."'
BACKGROUND
Determining the nature of the pueblo water rights and the relationship of these rights to those claimed by non-Indians is by no
means an easy task. It must be made against an historical background
spanning four centuries and three national governments. In addition,
the task is made more arduous by the obvious difficulty of determining and documenting those rights claimed under the Spanish and
Mexican governments, by the unique history and character of the
pueblos' land titles, and by the federal judiciary's changing treatment
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1113.

1111.
1113.
1113; the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 is 43 Stat. 636; the 1933 Act is 48 Stat.

108.
10. New Mexico v. Aanodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
11. Id. at 1120.
12. Id.at 1120.
13. Id.at 1120.
14. Id.at 1120.
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of the pueblos since the accession of New Mexico to the Union. The
conclusion of the Tenth Circuit majority that the pueblo water rights
are not governed by New Mexico's law of prior appropriation, coupled with its suggestion that these rights may be reserved rights, can
perhaps be explained by an awareness of these considerations. A
brief discussion should therefore be undertaken before attempting to
comment on the majority opinion.
When the Spaniards first entered New Mexico in the middle of the
sixteenth century, they found several established agricultural communities inhabited by people whom they called "Indios de los Pueblos." The Spanish government enacted legislation to protect the lands
of these Pueblo Indians from trespass. In addition, grants were made
by this government to each individual Pueblo defining and protecting
the boundaries of its lands.' s In 1689, after the Spanish had quelled
the Pueblo Rebellion, Spain acknowledged the title of various lands
on which the pueblos were residing.' 6 While under the rule of Spain,
the pueblos had "prior water rights to all streams, rivers, and other
waters which crossed or bordered their lands." 1 I
Spain ruled the area until 1821 when Mexico won its independence. Shortly before overthrowing the Spanish, the revolutionary
government of Mexico adopted what is known as "The Plan of
Iguala." 1' By this plan, the pueblos were recognized as citizens of
the new monarchy. 1 9 Although they were granted citizenship, the
pueblos' status of wardship and the restrictions limiting their power
to alienate land, established under Spanish sovereignty, did not
end. I Those Spanish laws in force prior to 1821 concerning pueblo
land policy remained in full force, and title to the Pueblo lands
remained in the name of individual pueblos.2
The Republic of Mexico ruled the area until 1848; in that year, it
ceded the land to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.2 2 Articles VIII and IX of this treaty protect rights recognized by prior sovereigns. By the Act of July 22, 1854,23 Congress
provided for the appointment of a Surveyor-General for New Mexico
to determine the character and extent of all claims to lands under the
15. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 383 (1971).
16. United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. (Gild.) 422, 427-28 (1869).
17. F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 383; see H. BRAYER, PUEBLO INDIAN LAND
GRANTS OF THE RIO ABAJO, NEW MEXICO (1939) for a study of the policy of the
Spanish government towards the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico.
18. F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 384.
19. United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. (Gild.) 422, 431 (1869).
20. F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 384.
21. Id.
22. 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
23. 10 Stat. 308 (1854).
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laws of Spain and Mexico. 2 4 On December 22, 1858, Congress acted
upon the report of the Surveyor-General and confirmed, among
others, the land claims of the San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambe, and
Tesuque Pueblos.2 s However, this confirmation, using language similar to that in a quit claim deed, was subject to the proviso that it
"shall only be construed as a relinquishment of all title and claim of
the United States to any of said lands, and shall not affect any
adverse valid rights, should such exist." 2"6 The possible adverse
claims which might be imposed upon the pueblos' title could have
originated in a number of ways, i.e. from grants of title under the
Spanish and Mexican governments, from purchases of pueblo land
and, perhaps, from outright intrusion.2 7 Consequently, the first
problem then in determining the water rights to the Nambe-Pojoaque
River System is ascertaining whether any adverse claims are valid and
the character and extent of the water rights accompanying the valid
claims. The determination of the latter must be made with reference
to the land titles of the Pueblos recognized by both Spain and Mexico and the water rights accompanying these titles. In addition, those
grants of title under the Spanish and Mexican governments which are
not adverse and do not touch the pueblos' lands but which carry
water rights to the Nambe-Pojoaque River System must be ascertained and, again, this determination must be made with reference to
the pueblo land titles and water rights recognized by the two previous sovereigns.
The determination of these various water rights is beset by a number of problems. First, establishing the non-Indian rights claimed
under the Spanish and Mexican governments may be difficult since
much of the proof substantiating these claims may be lost. Furthermore, the water rights accompanying the pueblo land titles may be
aboriginal rights which were unaffected by the rule of the Spanish or
Mexican governments or these governments may have legislatively
changed those rights. Determining whether these rights were so affected and to what extent may vary depending upon the way key
Spanish words are translated. In addition, by relinquishing its title
and recognizing the fee title of the pueblos in 1858, the United
States government put the pueblos in a position which may make the
cases defining Indian water rights "not technically applicable." Recognizing this latter problem the court stated in its opinion:
A relinquishment of title by the United States differs from the
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 309.
11 Stat. 374 (1858).
Id. at 374.
Seymour, Land Titles in the Pueblo Indian Country, 10 A.B.A.J. 36, 38 (1924).
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creation of a reservation for the Indians. In its relinquishment the
United States reserved nothing and expressly provided that its action
did not affect then existing adverse rights. The mentioned decisions
recognizing reserved water rights on reservations created by the
United States are not technically applicable. 2 8
The landmark case defining reserved rights is Winters v. United
States.2" This case involved a dispute between the Indians of the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation and certain non-Indians to the
waters of the Milk River in Montana. The federal government
brought the action to restrain the construction of a dam which, when
completed, would prevent the waters of the river from flowing to the
reservation. The reservation had been established in 1888 by treaty
between the United States and the Indians. After the treaty but
before the Indians had initiated appropriations from the Milk River,
the non-Indians settled upstream from the reservation lands and
diverted water for various beneficial uses. In settling the dispute, the
United States Supreme Court held that the reservation of lands by
the 1888 Treaty carried with it an implicit reservation of the waters
of the Milk River. The amount of this implicit reservation was held
to be that amount which
was sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the
3
reservation of lands. 0
In arriving at this holding, the Court drew upon both an earlier
case, United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,3 1 and upon
a quasi-contractual interpretation of the 1888 Treaty. 3 2 In United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., the Court ruled that a
state could not change the common law system of riparian water
rights if such a change destroyed the right of the United States, as
the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of
those waters which were necessary for the beneficial use of the government property. 3 In Winters, the United States, as trustee for the
Indians, held legal title to the reservation lands and these lands were
riparian to the Milk River. Accordingly the Court, following the Rio
Grande Dam ruling, found that despite both Montana's law of prior
appropriation and the prior appropriations by the non-Indians, the
right of the United States, and consequently the right of the Indians,
to the continued flow of the River could not be interfered with.
28. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
29. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
30. Bloom, Indian "Paramount"Rights to Water Use, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
669, 670 (1971).
31. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
32. Bloom, supra note 30, at 670 & 672.
33. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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In addition, the lower court in Winters, when determining the
rights granted to the Indians by the 1888 Treaty, engaged in a quasicontractual analysis which the Supreme Court followed on appeal.
Gerald R. Miller summarizes the analysis as follows:
The treaty made no reference whatsoever to water, but the court
looked to the circumstances surrounding the agreement in answering
the question. It visualized the Indians as happy nomads roaming over
a great and fruitful hunting ground. Surely they must have obtained
many valuable rights as an inducement to relinquish this splendid
inheritance. What were these inducements? The court found its
answer in the act ratifying the treaty, which stated that the Indians
were desirous of exchanging their excess lands for means which
would "enable them to become self-supporting, as a pastoral and
agricultural people, and to educate their children in the paths of
civilization...." When the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding the treaty were considered, it became evident to the court
that both the Indians and the government had assumed that the
water would be reserved. Without water the land would be valueless;
it would be impossible to secure the apparent governmental objective in reserving
the land, that of converting the Indians into a pas34
toral people.
Such an analysis coupled with the Rio Grande Dam ruling has led
to what is now called the Winters Doctrine. Briefly, the doctrine
states that a reservation of land established by treaty carries with il
an implicit reservation of water, the amount of which is to be determined by the purpose of the reservation. The doctrine, however, has
not been confined to lands reserved by treaty but has, in the course
of years, been extended to include other lands as well. In Unitea
States v. Powers,3 1 the doctrine was applied to allotments of reservation lands conveyed in fee by the Secretary of Interior to Indian
allottees. In making such an application, the Supreme Court followed
the Winters decision and reasoned that the lands in question would
have no value for agriculture without water and that therefore the
waters reserved by the initial reservation of lands to the Crow Indian,
passed to the subsequent Indian allottees. 3 6 In Arizona v. California,3 the doctrine was further extended to include lands reserved by
Executive Order. The Court, in rejecting Arizona's contention thal
water rights could not be reserved by Executive Order, said:
34. Miller, Indians, Water, and the Arid Western States-A Prelude to the Pelton Deci
sion, 5 UTAH L. REV. 495, 501 (1957).

35. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
36. Id. at 533.
37. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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In our view, these reservations, like those created directly by Congress, were not limited to land but included waters as well. Congress
and the Executive have ever since recognized these as Indian Reservations. Numerous appropriations, including appropriations for irrigation projects, have been made by Congress. They have been unifornly and universally treated as reservations by map makers,
surveyors, and the public. We can give but short shrift at this late
date to the argument that the reservations either of land or water
are
38
invalid because they were originally set apart by the Executive.
In addition, the Court agreed with the Special Master's ruling that
"the principle underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian

Reservations were equally applicable to other federal establishments
such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests." 39
This extension of the Winters Doctrine to include federal enclaves
was recently reinforced by the Supreme Court in Cappaertv. United
States.4 0 The issue in this case was whether the creation of a national monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated
water. The Court held that such a creation did reserve water rights
and said:
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the
Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available
water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are
necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was
created. 4 1

This statement by the Cappaert Court summarizes the rationale
underlying the Winters case and those extending its doctrine. However, a further extension of this reasoning to those lands held by the
pueblos in fee simple may perhaps be inappropriate since the rationale is based upon the existence of a reservation. As the Tenth Circuit
indicated, the federal government in 1858 did not reserve part of the
public domain for the pueblos; instead it confirmed the existing land
claims of the pueblos under the laws of Spain and Mexico and relinquished its claim to these lands. Therefore, if construed strictly, the
Winters Doctrine is not a proper means for defining the pueblo water
rights in the Nambe-Pojoaque River System since, as the court
stated: "The United States had nothing to reserve." 4 2
38. Id. at 598.

39. Id. at 601.
40. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
41. Id. at 139.
42. New Mexico v. Aamnodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
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If the application of the Winters Doctrine is not proper, resort
must again be made to the Spanish and Mexican legislation defining
the rights of the pueblos. This approach, as already indicated, is
subject to the problems of documentation and translation. Added to
these considerations are those problems resulting from the federal
judiciary's changing treatment of the pueblos since New Mexico
became part of the Union. In the years following the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the pueblos were distinguished from other Indian tribes for the purposes of existing statutes.4 3 A prime example
of this differentiation can be found in the early case of United States
v. Lucero.4 4 This case involved an action by the federal government
to enforce § 11 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 183444 6
which had been extended by § 7 of the Appropriation Act of 185 14
to include those Indian tribes within New Mexico. Section 11 made
settlement on Indian lands by a non-Indian a federal offense. The
defendant demurred to the government's petition and the trial court
sustained the demurrer. On appeal, the Supreme Court for the Territory of New Mexico affirmed the trial court's decision. In arriving at
its holding, the court had to consider whether § 11 was meant to
include pueblo lands. After a lengthy discussion dealing with the
distinctions between the pueblos and other Indians, the court concluded that the section did not include pueblo lands since the
pueblos were recognized as citizens by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and since it was the duty of the court to protect the rights of
citizens to the free enjoyment of their property. 4 The effect of this
decision was to sanction the alienation of pueblo land without the
prior consent of the United States.
This decision was reinforced by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Joseph.4 1 This case also involved an attempt by
the United States to enforce § 11 of the 1834 Act and again a demurrer to the government's petition was sustained by the Supreme Court
of the New Mexico Territory. Quoting with approval from the
Lucero decision, the Court found that the pueblo in question was
not an Indian tribe within the meaning of the statute 4 9 and that,
therefore, if the defendant was on the lands of the pueblo with the
consent of the inhabitants, the United States suffered no injury by
43. COHEN, supra note 15, at 387.
44. 1 N.M. (Gild.) 422 (1869).

45. 4 Stat. 729, 730 (1834).
46. 9 Stat. 574, 587 (1851).
47. United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. (Gild.) 422, 44041 (1869).

48. 94 U.S. 614 (1876).
49. Id. at 617-18.
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his presence. 5 This decision fortified the approval given by the
Lucero court to the alienation of pueblo land without the federal
government's prior consent. In addition the reasoning of both the

Lucero and Joseph decisions continued to be upheld by the territorial court through the first decade of the twentieth century.' 1
With the admission of New Mexico to statehood, the attitude of
the federal government toward the Pueblos began to change. This
alteration was first evidenced by a provision in the New Mexico
Enabling Act which specified that "the terms 'Indian' and 'Indian
country' shall include the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the
lands now owned or occupied by them."' 2 The constitutionality of
this provision was challenged in United States v. Sandoval' ' which
involved a criminal prosecution for introducing intoxicating liquor
into the Santa Clara Pueblo. The trial court sustained the demurrer
to the indictment upon the theory that the statute was invalid because, as applied to Indian pueblos in New Mexico, it usurped a part
of the State's police power and thus encroached upon its equal footing with other States. In rejecting this theory, the Supreme Court
indicated that the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal
government had, since 1854, regarded and treated the New Mexico
pueblos like other Indian tribes5 4 and further stated:
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic
in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government. 5

Since the 1834 Act contained a provision specifying that no conveyance of Indian land would be valid unless executed with the
consent of the federal government,' 6 the effect of the Sandoval
decision was not only to overrule the Lucero and Joseph decisions
but also to throw doubt on the validity of those non-Indian land
claims within the exterior boundaries of pueblo lands which had not
received the required consent.' I It was estimated that approximately
three thousand of these claims existed.' 1 In response to this situation, Congress enacted the Pueblo Lands Act of June 7, 1924. s 9 The
50. Id. at 619.
51. See F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 388 for those cases following the reasoning of the
Lucero and Joseph decisions.
52. 36 Stat. 557, 560 (1910).
53. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
54. Id. at 47.
55. Id. at 39.
56. 4 Stat. 729, 730 (1834).
57. F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 389.
58. H. BRAYER, supra note 17, at 26 (1939).
59. 43 Stat. 636 (1924).
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purpose of this Act was to settle title disputes between the pueblos
and those non-Indians claiming land within the pueblo grants. The
Act created a three-member board which was to determine the lands
and water rights that no longer remained in pueblo ownership
because of the negligence of the federal government. After such a
determination, the pueblos were to be compensated for these lost
lands and water rights by the United States. In addition, where it was
determined that the pueblos' titles had not been extinguished, the
Act provided that the Attorney General could bring quiet title actions for these lands. In defense to these actions, the non-Indian
claimants could raise a special statute of limitations. Several years
later, Congress enacted the Pueblo Lands Act of May 31, 193360
which approved appropriations for the pueblos in addition to those
established by the 1924 Act. Section 9 of the 1933 Act provided
that the prior rights of the pueblos to the use of waters touching
their lands would be recognized and would not be subject to loss by
nonuse or abandonment.6 1
Two years after the 1924 Act, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Candelaria6 2 reinforced its decision in Sandoval by again refusing
to exclude the pueblos from the term, "Indian tribe." This case
involved an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill brought by the
United States to quiet title to certain lands in the Laguna Pueblo.
The suit was brought on the theory that the federal government had
the authority and was under the duty to protect the pueblo in the
ownership and enjoyment of its lands. The defendants denied the
wardship of the United States and alleged that two previous decrees
to quiet title to the same lands brought against them by the pueblo
was a bar to the suit. In holding that the decrees were not a bar, the
Court referred to the provision in the 1834 Act restricting conveyances of Indian land and said:
While there is no express reference in the provision to Pueblo Indians, we think it must be taken as including them. They are plainly
within its spirit and, in our opinion, fairly within its words, "any
tribe of Indians." .. . A more reasonable view is that the term "In-

dian tribe" was used in the Acts of 1834 and 1851 in the sense of "a
body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory." (Cite omitted). In that sense
the term easily includes Pueblo Indians. 6 3

By 1926, therefore, the Supreme Court had established that the
60. 48 Stat. 108 (1933).
61. Id. at 111.
62. 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
63. Id. at 441-42.
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pueblos were to be regarded as Indians for the purposes of existing
statutes, and by 1933, Congress had enacted legislation to remedy
the problems caused by the Court's early approval of the New Mexico Territorial courts' differentiation between pueblos and other
Indian tribes.
THE INSTANT DECISION

Before the Tenth Circuit, the pueblos contended that their water
rights are not limited by New Mexico's doctrine of prior appropriation. In addition, they claimed that they have a reserved right equal
to that amount of water needed to irrigate the irrigable land within
each pueblo. 6 4 To support these arguments, the pueblos relied not
only upon the Winters case and the cases extending
its doctrine, but
6
also upon the Sandoval and Candelariadecisions. '
The court first addressed itself to the pueblos' reserved rights
claim and indicated that the pueblos had not obtained any rights by
either treaty or Executive Order. The court further pointed out that
the rights which the pueblos did have were those recognized by the
Spanish and Mexican governments and confirmed in 1858 by Congress. 6 6 The court then distinguished between a relinquishment of
title by the United States and the creation of a reservation for an
Indian tribe by the federal government. Based on this distinction, the
court concluded that the cases relied upon by the pueblos to support
their reserved right claim "are not technically applicable." 6 I However, impressed by the Sandoval and Candelaria decisions the court
suggested that, despite this technical inapplicability, Congress "may
well have intended to recognize the Winters decision" when it used
"the phrase 'prior rights' "in § 9 of the 1933 Act.6 8
The court then considered the pueblos' contention that their
water rights are not limited by New Mexico law and concluded that
this position was correct. 6 9 In arriving at this holding the court was
forced to reckon with New Mexico's argument that "whatever reserved rights the pueblos may have had were lost" as a result of the
adoption of the 1924 and 1933 Acts.' ° To support its argument the
State contended that 1) the increase in appropriations approved by
the 1933 Act was to pay the pueblos for any reserved rights they
64. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
65. Id. at 1109.
66. Id. at 1108-09.
67. Id. at 1111.
68. Id. at 1113.
69. Id. at 1112.
70. Id. at 1109.
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might have had, 71 2) the acceptance by the pueblos of these appropriations prevented them from claiming reserved rights,7 2 and 3) the
language of § 9 in the 1933 Act is an implied recognition that the
pueblo rights are subject to New Mexico law." 3
The court answered the state's first contention by ruling that the
increase in appropriations had nothing to do with reserved rights but
instead was established to correct the board's failure to include the
value of appurtenant water in its initial evaluation of awards. 7 4 With
respect to the state's second contention, the court ruled that since
title to the Pueblo lands remains in the federal government as trustee,
estoppel cannot be applied to prevent the pueblos from claiming
reserved rights. 7 In its third contention, the state argued that the
provision of § 9 specifying that the pueblos' prior rights would "not
be subject to loss by nonuse or abandonment" was an implied recognition that New Mexico law was controlling since no such provision
was necessary unless these rights were limited by state law. 7 6 In
response to this argument, the court pointed out that New Mexico's
Constitution disclaims title to Indian lands and recognizes the absolute control of Congress over these lands. Consequently, any intent
of Congress to relinquish such control must be express and "may not
be implied from a tortuous construction of the language used in
§ 9.-7 7
After thus dispensing with the State claims, the court divided the
possible non-Indian claimants into three classes and attempted to
give the lower court some tentative guidance concerning the priority
of uses among these groups and the pueblos. The first class included
those who held adversely to the pueblos before the 1858 Act. As to
this group, the court ruled that the lower court must determine the
relationship between the rights of the pueblos and those included in
this group under the laws of Spain and Mexico. The second class was
comprised of people holding lands within the pueblo grants as a
result of some circumstance occurring after 1858 other than the
negligence of the United States to protect pueblo rights. The court
refused to make any ruling as to this group since it did not know
what these claims were. 7 1 The last class included those non-Indians
whose rights were based on the limitation periods established by the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1109.
1110.
1110.
1109-10.
1110.
1110.
1110-11.
1112.
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1924 Act. After considering the three possible combinations of priorities between the pueblos and these non-Indians, the court ruled that
the pueblos' rights were superior to the non-Indian rights.7 9
The court closed its opinion by addressing the question of the
quantification of the pueblos' rights. Concluding that this problem
must be decided by the lower court, it directed the lower court's
attention to Spanish and Mexican
law and to the provisions of the
0
8
California.
v.
Arizona
in
decree
COMMENT
In holding that the pueblo water rights are not limited by the state
doctrine of prior appropriation, the Tenth Circuit made the correct
ruling in view of the facts and the arguments presented by the State
of New Mexico. It cannot be disputed that the Spanish government
recognized the water rights of the pueblos and that Mexico also
recognized these rights; nor can it be disputed that by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo the United States agreed to protect those pueblo
rights recognized by these two prior sovereigns. In addition, it should
be acknowledged that one of the significant results of the Sandoval
and Candelaria decisions was to place the pueblos firmly under the
protection of the federal government. Today the pueblos as Indian
tribes remain under such jurisdiction and control. Consequently, it is
clear that the pueblos' water rights are not subject to the laws of
New Mexico. Furthermore, the 1924 and 1933 Acts did nothing to
change this situation but instead were enacted to solve the problems
caused by the Lucero and Joseph decisions. The state, ignoring not
only the words of the Acts but also basic statutory construction,
manipulated these laws in an attempt to subject the pueblos' water
rights to New Mexico law. Apparently aware of this motive, the
court forthrightly dispensed with the State's arguments.
However, when dealing with the reserved rights claim of the pueblos, the court was less straightforward and expressed its suggestion
that the pueblos may have reserved rights in tentative terms. This
hesitancy to rule resolutely on the nature of pueblo water rights is
explained by the court's own conclusion that the Winters decision
and the cases extending it are "not technically applicable" to the
pueblos. This conclusion is based upon the fact that, by the terms of
the 1858 Act, 8 the pueblos received fee simple title to their land.
According to the court, this "relinquishment of title by the United
79. Id. at 1112-13.
80. Id. at 1113.
81. 11 Stat. 374 (1858).
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States differs from the creation of a reservation for the Indians." 8 2
Despite this difference however, the court, influenced by the Sandoval and Candelaria decisions that the pueblos are to be treated like
other Indian communities, concluded that the pueblos, because they
are Indians, may have reserved rights. Put simply therefore, the court
was aware that the reasoning of the Winters case and its progeny is
not logically consistent with the pueblos' situation and it attempted
to reconcile this inconsistency by resorting to the Sandoval and Candelaria decisions.
It is easy to understand and appreciate this hesitant attitude of the
court. The technical inapplicability of the Winters decision to the
situation of the pueblos is found not only in the absence of a federally created reservation but also in the absence of other factors
which, it has been argued, are crucial to the finding of a reserved
right. For example, it has been contended by major commentators8 3
that the rationale underlying the Winters decision rests upon a quasicontractual analysis of the 1888 Treaty, i.e., when the land was
reserved, the Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation were implicitly
given sufficient waters to support the agricultural existence they
were intended to undertake in consideration for the relinquishment
of the greater part of their lands to the federal government.' 4 If this
is the basis for the Winters decision, the conclusion that necessarily
follows is that the pueblos do not have a reserved right because they
gave up no lands and were already an agricultural people when they
came under American sovereignty. Continuing with this argument, it
might be further contended that the inconsistency revealed by this
quasi-contractual analysis is not resolved by the Sandoval and Candelaria holdings for two reasons. First, these holdings resulted from
the necessity to construe two Congressional statutes in particular
situations. Because of this fact, they have no weight except for ascertaining Congressional intent and the meaning of similar statutes and
cannot be extended to apply to a judicially created principle such as
the Winters Doctrine. Second, although the Sandoval and Candelaria
decisions hold that the pueblos are to be treated like other Indian
communities, using these holdings to give the pueblos reserved rights
erodes the quasi-contractual analysis underlying the Winters decision
because the characteristics which differentiate the pueblos from
other Indian communities, i.e. sedentary and agricultural as opposed
to nomadic and food-gathering, are related to those very components
82. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1111 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
83. See Bloom, supra note 30, at 672-74.
84. Id. at 672.
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which comprise the major portion of the analysis. Therefore, to ignore these differentiating characteristics and give the pueblos reserved rights is to ignore the analysis upon which the Winters decision rests.
Of course, the first reason may be specious in the present situation
since the court used the Sandoval and Candelaria decisions in an
endeavor to ascertain the meaning of "prior right" in § 9 of the 1933
Act.8 s These decisions, therefore, are relevant in determining the
nature of pueblo water rights since, as in these cases, the court is
faced with the problem of ascertaining congressional intent with
respect to a federal statute. However, despite this relevance, it could
be argued that these cases should not be used because the effect of
their application to determine the meaning of "prior right" is to give
the pueblos reserved rights and this finding disregards those factors
which differentiate the pueblos from other Indian communities
which, as the second reason contends, necessarily results in ignoring
the analysis upon which the Winters decision rests.
These arguments may be answered by simply denying the importance of the quasi-contractual analysis and emphasizing instead the
presence of federal control over the land as the primary consideration in finding a reserved right. However, this type of analysis may
not be entirely successful in refuting these arguments. Nevertheless,
such an emphasis does find support in the Court's rulings in Arizona
v. California8 6 and Cappaert v. United States.8 1 In the former case,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master's ruling that "the
principle underlying the reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments such as
National Recreation Areas and National Forests." 8 (Emphasis
added.) In Cappaert, the Court held that a reservation of a national
8
monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated water. 9
In both cases, a reserved right was found despite the absence of
either a relinquishment of land or an attempt to establish an agriculturally-based tribe. The conclusion that can be drawn from these
rulings is that the Supreme Court does not view the quasi-contractual
analysis underlying the Winters decision as a controlling factor in
finding a reserved right but instead regards the presence of federal
control as the primary consideration. This control may take various
85. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
86. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
87. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
88. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
89. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 147 (1976).
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occur, 2 1 and thus cause inconvenience to appellants, the court again
followed Nuesse. The court in that case stated that "in the intervention area the 'interest' test is primarily a practical guide to dispose of
lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is
compatible with efficiency and due process. "22
Finally, the Court found a third basis for allowing intervention:
the appellants' interests might not be adequately represented by existing parties.2 3 According to the standard established by Trbovich v.
United Mineworkers of America,2 4 appellants had a minimal burden
of showing that existing representation "may be" inadequate to protect their interest. Because the EPA is broadly concerned with implementation and enforcement of the settlement agreement and the
appellants are more narrowly concerned with proceedings that may
affect their industries, the court found this minimal burden was met.
"With the clear possibility of disparate interests, we think appellants
have shown that EPA representation may not be adequate." '2 I The
court further stated that the interests of EPA and appellants can be
expected to coincide, with the only difference being that appellants'
interests are more focused on regulations that effect industries. In
spite of this, the Court held, a Second Circuit case, New York Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Regents,2 6 should be followed:
Given the acknowledged impact that regulation can be expected to
have upon their operations, appellants' participation in defense of
EPA decisions that accord with their interest may also be likely to
serve as a vigorous and helpful supplement to EPA's defense. Many
of these decisions turn ...on questions of very technical detail and
data; on the basis of their experience and expertise in their relevant
fields, appellants can reasonably be expected to contribute to the
informed resolutions of these questions ..2
21. Appellants' brief referred to the court-ordered timetable prescribed in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975). By Aug. 1976, there
had been fourteen orders modifying thy initial timetable of Nov. 1973 for the promulgation
of final guideline regulations.
22. Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
23. Rule 24(a)(2) provides that if requirements as to timeliness and impairment of interest are met, intervention shall be allowed unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

24. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
25. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 912 (D.C. Cir.

1977).
26. 516 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 912-13 (D.C. Cir.

1977).
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have intended to recognize the Winters decision. Such an intent is
consonant with both Sandoval and Candelaria."9' However, by
basing the suggestion that the pueblos may have reserved rights on
these two cases and the legislative history of these two Acts, the
court has in effect changed the traditional analysis for determining
the existence of a reserved right. In the past, the existence of such a
right depended upon whether there was a federal reservation of land
and whether the government intended to reserve previously unappropriated waters. By suggesting that the pueblos may have reserved
rights despite the absence of a reservation, the court in this instance
has disregarded the requirement that a reserved right be based upon a
reservation of land. This is apparent upon examining the court's
analysis of the pueblos' reserved rights claim. Although the court
refers in this analysis to the logical inconsistency of a fee title with
the concept of a reserved right and to the technical inapplicability of
the Winters decision and the other relevant cases to the situation of
the pueblos,9 2 the court's failure to act upon this inconsistency and
inapplicability and rule resolutely that the pueblos do not have reserved rights indicates that the court, in the final analysis, really does
not consider the existence of a reservation to be a necessary element
in the creation of a reserved right. Indeed, the court discounts the
fact that the pueblos do not hold land by reservation. After referring
to the Winters, Arizona, and Cappaert decisions, the court, citing the
Sandoval opinion, states: "The fact that the Pueblos hold fee simple
'9
makes no difference." 3
If the Tenth Circuit's reasoning indicates that it does not consider
a reservation to be a prerequisite for the creation of a reserved right,
what does the court regard as necessary for the creation of such a
right? Although the court never addresses this question, a possible
answer may nevertheless be discovered by examining the basis for its
suggestion that the pueblos may have reserved rights. As mentioned
before, the court bases this suggestion in part on the Sandoval and
Candelaria cases. These decisions hold that the pueblos are to be
treated like other Indian communities. In arriving at its suggestion,
the court indicates that this similar treatment is based upon those
features held in common by both the pueblos and other Indian communities. Among these common features, the court singles out the
presence of federal control over Indian and pueblo lands and the
exercise of this control through federal guardianship. For example,
91. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
92. Id. at 1111.
93. Id. at 1111.
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when analyzing the pueblos' reserved rights claim, the court states
that "[u nder Sandoval and Candelaria,the United States has treated
the Pueblos like other Indians. It is their guardian and trustee. The
lands of the Pueblos may not be alienated without its consent. 4
(Emphasis added) In discussing the meaning of "prior right" in § 9 of
the 1933 Act, the court again refers to this control and guardianship.
Although expressing concern over the lack of a reservation, the court
nevertheless states:
"

Sandoval says [cites omitted] that the Pueblos "have been regarded
and treated by the United States as requiring special consideration

and protection, like other Indian communities." Candelariareaffirms
Sandoval and says [cites omitted] that the lands of the pueblos "like
the tribal lands of other Indians owned in fee under patents from the
United States are 'subject to the legislation of Congress enacted in
the exercise of the Government's guardianship' over Indian tribes
and their property." 9 5 (Emphasis added.)
Since the suggestion that the pueblos may have reserved rights is
based on these two cases and since the court, in arriving at this
suggestion, quotes statements from these cases which refer to the
presence of federal control over the land and to the exercise of this
control through guardianship, it follows that the court considers this
control and guardianship to be necessary elements in the creation of
a reserved right. If this line of reasoning is correct, the court has
unwittingly formulated a new test to determine the existence of a
reserved right. Under this test, the existence of such a right depends
not upon whether there is a federal reservation of land but upon
whether there is federal control over the land which is exercised
through guardianship. Put more simply, a reserved right attaches to
land whenever it is held in trust by the federal government. Once the
necessity of a reservation is eliminated, it could be argued that this
new test is a logical step in the extension of the Winters Doctrine to
include lands other than those reserved by treaty which was begun
by United States v. Powers9 6 and more recently reinforced by
Cappaert v. United States.9 As previously mentioned, both Arizona
v. California9 and Cappaert extend reserved rights to lands under
the control and trusteeship of the federal government. The new test
formulated by the Tenth Circuit emphasizes these elements and is
thus a logical extension and refinement of the Winters Doctrine.
94. Id. at 1111.
95. Id. at 1113.

96. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
97. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
98. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).

July 1978]

PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

Of course, it could be contended that to eliminate the necessity of
a reservation is to destroy the very foundation upon which the Winters Doctrine is built. Such a contention has merit since the Doctrine
was invented partly to respond to the special considerations created
by a federal reservation and since the cases which find the existence
of a reserved right all deal with lands reserved by the federal government. However, it could be argued that this elimination is not without precedent since in the past the Doctrine has discarded, in
response to various situations, elements which at one time were considered integral to its foundation. For example, in Arizona and
Cappaertthe quasi-contractual analysis, which has been contended to
be the underlying rationale of the Winters decision, disappears as a
relevant consideration in determining the existence of a reserved
right. Thus eliminating the necessity of a reservation, while perhaps a
major alteration of the policy behind the Winters Doctrine, can be
viewed as another step in the evolution of the Doctrine which nevertheless does not violate its spirit since the elements of federal control
and federal guardianship are still left intact.
With this new test, the consideration of whether a reservation of
land was made by the United States has been replaced with the
consideration of whether the land is held in trust by the federal
government. Implicit in the latter is the issue of whether the federal
government intended to reserve previously unappropriated waters. In
its analysis of the meaning of "prior right" in § 9, the court seems to
indicate that such an intent may be inferred by the mere fact that
the land is Indian land. Although again expressing concern over the
lack of a reservation, the court states: "By using the phrase 'prior
rights' in § 9 Congress may well have intended to recognize the Winters decision. Such an intent is consonant with both Sandoval and
Candelaria."9 In its favor, it can be said that this new test results
not only in an uniform treatment of all Indians but also in an uniform body of water rights with respect to all Indians. Indeed, this
may explain the court's willingness to suggest that the pueblos may
have reserved rights despite its recognition that the Winters decision
and the cases extending its doctrine are "not technically applicable."
However, the new test may create new problems. For example, under
this test a tribe could buy land, put it in trust with the United States
as trustee, and thereby create a reserved right. Of course, this ability
to create such a right could be checked by the federal government's
refusal to act as trustee. Therefore, a reserved right would still
99. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. New Mexico v. United States, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

depend upon the intent of the government to reserve previously
unappropriated waters. Other problems, yet to be determined, may
arise. Whether they could be as easily dispensed with as the example
given cannot be said. In addition, whether this test will even be
recognized and used by future litigants remains to be seen. In any
event, since the Supreme Court has denied the State of New Mexico's
petition for certiorari,' 0 0 further litigation must occur before a
final, authoritative ruling on the validity of the test may be had.
A.PATRICK MAYNEZ

100. Id.

